We develop a tractable framework for the analysis of the relationship between contractual incompleteness, technological complementarities, and technology adoption. In our model a …rm chooses its technology and investment levels in contractible activities by suppliers of intermediate inputs. Suppliers then choose investments in noncontractible activities, anticipating payo¤s from an ex post bargaining game. We show that greater contractual incompleteness leads to the adoption of less advanced technologies, and that the impact of contractual incompleteness is more pronounced when there is greater complementary among the intermediate inputs. We embody this model in a general equilibrium framework and study the implications for industrial structure and variations in comparative advantage across countries.
Introduction
There is widespread agreement that di¤erences in technology are a major source of productivity di¤erences across …rms, industries and nations. 1 Despite this widespread agreement, we are far from an established framework for the analysis of technology choices of …rms. In this paper, we take a step in this direction, and develop a simple model to study the impact of contracting institutions, which regulate the relationship between the …rm and its suppliers, on technology choices.
Our model combines two well-established approaches. The …rst is the representation of technology as the range of intermediate inputs used by …rms; a greater range of intermediate inputs increases productivity by allowing greater specialization and thus corresponds to more "advanced" technology. 2 The second is Grossman and Hart's (1986) and Hart and Moore's (1990) approach to incomplete-contracting models of the …rm. We study technology choice of …rms under incomplete contracts, and extend Hart and Moore's framework, by allowing contracts to be partially incomplete. This combination enables us to investigate how the degree of contractual incompleteness and the extent of technological complementarities between intermediate inputs a¤ect the choice of technology.
In our baseline model a …rm decides on technology (on the range of specialized intermediate goods), recognizing that a more advanced technology is more productive, but also entails a variety of costs. In addition to the costs of engaging more suppliers (corresponding to the greater range of intermediate inputs), a more advanced technology necessitates contracting with more suppliers.
All of the activities that suppliers undertake are relationship-speci…c, and a fraction of those is ex ante contractible, while the rest, as in the work by Grossman-Hart-Moore, are nonveri…able and noncontractible. The fraction of contractible activities is our measure of the quality of contracting institutions. 3 Suppliers are contractually obliged to perform their duties in the contractible activities, but they are free to choose their investments in noncontractible activities and to withhold their services in these activities from the …rm. This combination of noncontractible investments and relationship-speci…city leads to an ex post multilateral bargaining problem. As in Hart and Moore (1990) , we use the Shapley value to determine the division of ex post surplus between the …rm and its suppliers. We derive an explicit solution for this division of surplus, which enables us to develop a simple characterization of the equilibrium.
A supplier's expected payo¤ in the bargaining game determines her willingness to invest in the noncontractible activities. Since she is not the full claimant of the output gains derived from her investments, she tends to underinvest. Greater contractual incompleteness thus reduces supplier investments, making more advanced technologies less pro…table. We also show that a greater degree of technological complementarity reduces the incentive to choose more advanced technologies; though greater technological complementarity increases equilibrium ex post payo¤s to every supplier, it also makes their payo¤s less sensitive to their noncontractible investments, discouraging investments and depressing the pro…tability of more advanced technologies.
A noteworthy advantage of our framework is its relative tractability, which enables us to investigate a range of general equilibrium applications in Section 5. In anticipation of these and for other applications of this framework, it is useful to note that the equilibrium of our model leads to a reduced-form pro…t function for …rms given by
where N represents the technology level, C (N ) is the cost of technology N , A is a measure of aggregate demand or the scale of the market, and w 0 N corresponds to the value of the N suppliers' outside options. F (N ) is an increasing function that captures the positive e¤ect of choosing more advanced technologies on revenue. The e¤ects of contractual incompleteness and technological complementarity are summarized by the variable Z, which is endogenously determined and responds to changes in underlying parameters. In particular, Z is decreasing in the degree of contract incompleteness and the degree of technological complementarity. Moreover, the elasticity of Z with respect to is higher when there is greater complementarity between intermediate inputs.
This last result has important implications for equilibrium industrial structure and the patterns of comparative advantage, because it implies that sectors (…rms) with greater complementarities between intermediates are more "contract dependent".
An interesting result of our general equilibrium analysis is that, because of the resource constraint, an improvement in contracting institutions does not increase the choice of technology in all sectors (…rms). Instead, more advanced technologies are chosen in the more contract-dependent sectors, i.e., those with greater complementarities between their intermediate inputs, while worse technologies are chosen in other sectors. In the context of an open economy, this feature leads to an endogenous structure of comparative advantage, which is a function of di¤erences across countries in contracting institutions. In particular, among countries with identical technological opportunities (production possibility sets), those with better contracting institutions specialize in sectors with greater complementarities among inputs.
As mentioned above, our work relates most closely to two strands of the literature. The …rst investigates the determinants of …rm-level technology (including the division of labor). Here Becker and Murphy (1992) and Yang and Borland (1991) , among others, focus on the impact of the extent of the market on the division of labor, while Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) , and many others, focus on country-level determinants of the rate of improvements in technology. None of these papers develop a model of the e¤ect of contracting institutions on technology choice (and specialization). The second literature deals with the internal organization of the …rm. It includes the papers by Grossman-Hart-Moore discussed above, as well as Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , who emphasize incomplete contracts and hold-up problems. Here, two papers by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) are most closely related to ours. Stole and Zwiebel consider a relationship between a …rm and a number of workers whose wages are determined by ex post bargaining according to the Shapley value. They show how the …rm may overemploy in order to reduce the bargaining power of the workers and discuss the implications of this framework for a number of organizational design issues. 4 Stole and Zwiebel's framework does not have relationshipspeci…c investments, however, which is at the core of our approach, and they do not discuss the e¤ects of the degree of contractual incompleteness and the degree of complementarity between inputs on the equilibrium technology adoption.
Finally, a number of recent papers have investigated the link between contracts and economic growth or patterns of trade. For example, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) , Verdier (2000, 2004) and Francois and Roberts (2003) study the impact of changes in the internal organization of the …rm on economic growth. Levchenko (2003) , Costinot (2004) , Nunn (2004) and Antràs (2005) , on the other hand, generate endogenous comparative advantage across countries from differences in contractual environments. Among these papers, Costinot (2004) is most closely related, since he also constructs a model of endogenous comparative advantage based on specialization, though his approach is more reduced-form than our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic environment.
Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium with complete contracts. Section 4 introduces incomplete contracts into the framework of Section 2, characterizes the equilibrium, and derives the major comparative static results. Section 5 embodies the partial equilibrium model of Section 4 in a general equilibrium framework, and discusses how di¤erences in contracting institutions impact the structure of industries and how it generates endogenous comparative advantage. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of the main results are provided in the Appendix.
Technology and Payo¤s
Consider a pro…t-maximizing …rm facing a demand function q = Ap 1=(1 ) for its …nal product, where q denotes quantity and p denotes price. The parameter 2 (0; 1) determines the elasticity of demand while A > 0 determines the level of demand. The …rm treats the demand level A as exogenous. This form of demand can be derived from a constant elasticity of substitution preference structure for di¤erentiated products (see Section 5) and it generates a revenue function
Production depends on the level of technology adopted by the …rm. 
A number of features of this production function are worth noting. First, determines the degree of complementarity between inputs; since 2 (0; 1), the elasticity of substitution between them, 1= (1 ), is always greater than one. Second, we follow Benassy (1998) in introducing the term N +1 1= in front of the integral, which allows us to separately control the elasticity of substitution between inputs and the elasticity of output with respect to the level of the technology. To see this,
suppose that X (j) = X, the same for all j. Then the output of technology N is q = N +1 X. In this event does not a¤ect output, nor productivity de…ned as either q= (N X) or q=N . Yet in both cases greater N translates into greater productivity, and the parameter determines the elasticity of productivity with respect to N . 5
There is a large number of pro…t-maximizing suppliers that can produce the necessary intermediate goods, each with the same outside option w 0 . For now, w 0 is taken as given, but it will be endogenized in Section 5. We assume that each intermediate input needs to be produced by a di¤erent supplier with whom the …rm needs to contract. 6 A supplier assigned to the production of an intermediate input needs to undertake relationshipspeci…c investments in a unit measure of (symmetric) activities. There is a constant marginal cost of investment c x for each activity. 7 The production function of intermediate inputs is Cobb-Douglas and symmetric in the activities:
where x (i; j) is the level of investment in activity i performed by the supplier of input j. This formulation will allow a tractable parameterization of contractual incompleteness in Section 4, whereby a subset of the investments necessary for production will be nonveri…able and thus noncontractible.
Finally, we assume that adopting (and using) a technology N involves costs C (N ), and impose
Assumption 1
(i) For all N > 0, C (N ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, with C 0 (N ) > 0 and C 00 (N ) 0.
5 In contrast, with the standard speci…cation of the CES production function, without the term N +1 1= in front (i.e., = 1= 1), total output is q = N 1= X, and the two elasticities are governed by the same parameter, . 6 A previous version of the paper, Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2005) , also endogenized the allocation of inputs to suppliers using an augmented model with additional diseconomies of scope.
7 One can think of cx as the marginal cost of e¤ort; see the formulation of this e¤ort in utility terms in Section 5.
(
The …rst part of this assumption is standard; costs are increasing and convex. The second part will ensure a …nite and positive choice of N .
Let the payment to supplier j consist of two parts: an ex ante payment (j) before the investment levels x (i; j) take place, and a payment s (j) after the investments. Then, the payo¤ to supplier j, also taking account of her outside option, is
Similarly, the payo¤ to the …rm is
where R is revenue and the other two terms on the right-hand side represent costs. Substituting (3) and (4) into (2), revenue can be expressed as
3 Equilibrium under Complete Contracts
As a benchmark, consider the case of complete contracts (the "…rst best" from the viewpoint of the …rm). With complete contracts, the …rm has full control over all investments and pays each supplier her outside option. In analogy to our treatment below of technology adoption under incomplete contracts, consider a game form where the …rm chooses a technology level N and makes a contract o¤er
If a supplier accepts this contract for input j, she is obliged to supply fx (i; j)g i2[0;1] as stipulated in the contract in exchange for the payments fs (j) ; (j)g. A subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is a strategy combination for the …rm and the suppliers such that suppliers maximize (5) and the …rm maximizes (6). A subgame perfect equilibrium can be alternatively represented as a solution to the following maximization problem:
subject to (7) and the suppliers'participation constraint,
Since the …rm has no reason to provide rents to the suppliers, it chooses payments s (j) and (j) that satisfy (9) with equality. 8 Moreover, since the …rm's objective function, (8), is (jointly) concave in the investment levels x (i; j) and these investments are all equally costly, the …rm chooses the same investment level x for all activities in all intermediate inputs. These observations enable us to substitute for (9) in (8), to obtain the following simpler unconstrained maximization problem for the …rm:
From the …rst-order conditions of this problem, we obtain:
Equations (11) and (12) can be solved recursively. Given Assumption 1, equation (11) When all the investment levels are identical and equal to x, output equals q = N +1 x. Since N X = N x inputs are used in the production process, we can de…ne productivity as output divided by total input use, P = N . In the case of complete contracts this productivity level is
which is increasing in the level of technology. In the next section we compare this productivity level to the productivity level under incomplete contracts. 10 The following proposition describes the key properties of this equilibrium and is proved in the Appendix:
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then with complete contracts there exists a unique equilibrium with technology and investment levels N > 0 and x > 0 given by (11) and (12). Furthermore, this equilibrium satis…es:
In the case of complete contracts, the size of the market (as parameterized by the demand level A) has a positive e¤ect on specialization. In our model a larger market induces larger investments 8 With complete contracts, (j) and s (j) are perfect substitutes, so that only the sum s (j) + (j) matters. This will not be the case when contracts are incomplete. 9 We show in the Appendix that the second-order conditions are satis…ed under Assumption 1. 1 0 This measure of productivity implicitly assumes that all the investments x (i; j) are measured accurately. There may be some tension between this assumption and the assumption that the cost of these investments is not pecuniary. For this reason in the previous version, Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2005) , we considered another de…nition of productivity: output divided by the number of suppliers, P = q=N . In this case P = (N ) x. The ranking of productivity levels between complete and incomplete contracts is the same under both de…nitions. The timing of events is as follows:
The …rm adopts a technology N and o¤ers a contract [fx c (i; j)g i=0 ; (j)] for every intermediate input j 2 [0; N ], where x c (i; j) is an investment level in a contractible activity and (j)
is an upfront payment to supplier j. The payment (j) can be positive or negative.
Potential suppliers decide whether to apply for the contracts. Then the …rm chooses N suppliers, one for each intermediate input j.
All suppliers j 2 [0; N ] simultaneously choose investment levels x (i; j) for all i 2 [0; 1]. In the contractible activities i 2 [0; ] they invest x (i; j) = x c (i; j).
The suppliers and the …rm bargain over the division of revenue, and at this stage, suppliers can withhold their services in noncontractible activities.
Output is produced and sold, and the revenue R is distributed according to the bargaining agreement.
1 1 Other comparative static results are straightforward, and are omitted to save space. 1 2 Grossman-Hart-Moore and the incomplete contracts literature also assume that revenues are noncontractible. As is well known, with bilateral contracting or with multilateral contracting and a budget breaker (e.g., Holmström, 1982) , contracting on revenues would improve incentives. In our setting, we do not need this assumption; each …rm has a continuum of suppliers and (with or without a budget breaker) any contract on total revenues would provide no incentives to suppliers to undertake ex ante investments.
We will characterize a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE for short) of this game, where bargaining outcomes in all subgames are determined by Shapley values.
De…nition of Equilibrium and Preliminaries
Behavior along the SSPE can be described by a tuple nÑ ;x c ;x n ;~ o in whichÑ represents the level of technology,x c the investment in contractible activities,x n the investment in noncontractible activities, and~ the upfront payment to every supplier. That is, for every j 2 h 0;Ñ i the upfront payment is (j) =~ , and the investment levels are x (i; j) =x c for i 2 [0; ] and x (i; j) =x n for i 2 ( ; 1]. With a slight abuse of terminology, we will denote the SSPE by
The SSPE can be characterized by backward induction. First, consider the penultimate stage of the game, with N as the level of technology, x c as the level of investment in contractible activities.
Suppose also that each supplier other than j has chosen a level of investment in noncontractible activities equal to x n ( j) (these are all the same, because we are constructing a symmetric equilibrium), while the investment level in every noncontractible activity by supplier j is x n (j). 13 Given these investments, the suppliers and the …rm will engage in multilateral bargaining, and as noted above, we assume that the outcome of this bargaining process is determined by the Shapley value.
Denote the Shapley value of supplier j under these circumstances by s x [N; x c ; x n ( j) ; x n (j)]. We derive an explicit formula for this value in the next subsection. For now, note that optimal investment by supplier j implies that x n (j) is chosen to maximize s x [N; x c ; x n ( j) ; x n (j)] minus the cost of investment in noncontractible activities, (1 ) c x x n (j). In a symmetric equilibrium, we need x n (j) = x n ( j), or in other words, x n needs to be a …xed-point given by: 14
Equation (14) can be thought of as an "incentive compatibility constraint," with the additional symmetry requirement.
In a symmetric equilibrium with technology N , with investment in contractible activities given by x c and with investment in noncontractible activities equal to x n , the revenue of the …rm is given
. Moreover, let s x (N; x c ; x n ) = s x (N; x c ; x n ; x n ), then the Shapley value of the …rm is obtained as a residual:
Now consider the stage in which the …rm chooses N suppliers from a pool of applicants. This pool is empty if suppliers expect to receive less than their outside option, w 0 . Therefore, for production to take place, the …nal-good producer has to o¤er a contract that yields a net reward at least as large as the suppliers'outside option. That is: (14). (15) This is the suppliers' "participation constraint": given N and (x c ; ), every supplier j 2 [0; N ] expects her Shapley value plus the upfront payment to cover the cost of investment in contractible and noncontractible activities and the value of her outside option. If the …rm were to choose a technology N and a contract (x c ; ) that did not satisfy this participation constraint, it would not attract any suppliers.
The …rm chooses N and designs a contract (x c ; ) to maximize its pro…ts, i.e.: max N;xc;xn; (14) and (15).
With no restrictions on , the participation constraint (15) will be satis…ed with equality;
otherwise the …rm could reduce without violating (15) and increase its pro…ts. We can therefore solve from this constraint, substitute the solution into the …rm's objective function, and obtain the simpler maximization problem: 15 max N;xc;xn
The SSPE nÑ ;x c ;x n o solves this problem, and the corresponding upfront payment satis…es
Bargaining
We now derive the Shapley values in this game (see Shapley, 1953, or Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) . According to the Shapley value, in a bargaining game with a …nite number of players every player's payo¤ is the average of her contributions to all coalitions that consist of players ordered below her in all feasible permutations. More explicitly, in a game with M + 1 players, let g = fg (0) ; g (1) ; :::; g (M )g be a permutation of 0; 1; 2; :::; M , where player 0 is the …rm and players 1; 2; :::; M are the suppliers, and let z j g = fj 0 j g (j) > g (j 0 )g be the set of players ordered below j in the permutation g. We denote by G the set of feasible permutations and by v : G ! R the value of the coalition consisting of any subset of the M + 1 players. 16 Then the Shapley value of player j is
Note that, as in the case with complete contracts, the …rm chooses its technology and investment levels to maximize sale revenues net of total costs. The key di¤erence is that with incomplete contracts, this maximization problem is constrained by the "incentive compatibility" condition (14).
1 6 In our game, the value of a coalition equals the amount of revenue this coalition can generate.
Since in our game there is a continuum of players, the above formula cannot be used. In the Appendix (in particular, proof of Lemma 1), we derive the asymptotic Shapley value of Aumann and Shapley (1974) , which is de…ned as the limit of the solution of an analogous game with a …nite number of players when the number of players goes to in…nity. 17 Leaving the formal derivation to the Appendix, here we provide a more heuristic derivation of this Shapley value.
Consider the case in which the …rm has adopted technology N and all suppliers provide an amount x c of every contractible activity. As for the noncontractible activities, consider a situation in which a particular supplier j invests an amount x n (j) in every noncontractible activity, while the remaining suppliers invest x n ( j) in every noncontractible activity (note that we are again appealing to symmetry). The …rst step in computing the Shapley value for this particular supplier j consists of determining her marginal contribution to a given coalition of agents. This computation is facilitated by the fact that the …rm is an essential player, i.e., if a coalition does not include the …rm, then its output equals zero regardless of its size, and therefore the supplier's marginal contribution equals zero as well. In contrast, when the coalition includes the …rm and a measure n of suppliers, the marginal contribution of this supplier is
where
is the revenue derived from the employment of n inputs with technology N , and the last input k = n is provided by supplier j. Since x (i; k) = x c for all 0 i and all 0 k n, x (i; k) = x n ( j) for all < i 1 and all 0 k < n, and x (i; k) = x n (j) for all < i 1 and k = n, this marginal contribution can be written as
The Shapley value of supplier j is the average of her marginal contributions to coalitions that consist of players ordered below her in all feasible orderings. In particular, consider all of the players in this bargaining game (including the …rm) as being randomly ordered, then a supplier that has a measure n of players ordered below her has a marginal contribution of m (j; n) if the …rm is ordered below her, i.e., with probability n=N , and 0 otherwise, i.e., with probability 1 n=N (since the …rm is essential for production). Averaging over all possible and equally-likely orderings of the players, we can use (18) to compute
This discussion gives a heuristic proof of the following lemma (which is proved more formally in the Appendix):
Lemma 1 Suppose that supplier j invests x n (j) in her noncontractible activities, all the other suppliers invest x n ( j) in their noncontractible activities, every supplier invests x c in her contractible activities, and the level of technology is N . Then the Shapley value of supplier j is
where is de…ned in (19).
A number of features of (20) are worth noting. First, in equilibrium, all suppliers invest equally in all the noncontractible activities, i.e., x n (j) = x n ( j) = x n , and so
is the total revenue of the …rm. Thus, the joint Shapley value of the suppliers, N s x (N; x c ; x n ), equals the fraction 1 of the revenue, and the …rm receives the remaining fraction , i.e.,
which is a relatively simple rule for the division of revenue between the …rm and its suppliers.
Second, the derived parameter = ( + ) represents the bargaining power of the …rm; it is increasing in and decreasing in . A higher elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs,
i.e., a higher , raises the …rm's bargaining power, because it makes every supplier less essential in production and therefore raises the share of revenue appropriated by the …rm. In contrast, a higher elasticity of demand for the …nal good, i.e., higher , reduces the …rm's bargaining power, because, for any coalition, it reduces the marginal contribution of the …rm to the coalition's payo¤ as a fraction of revenue. 18 1 8 To clarify the e¤ects of and on , let us return to the heuristic argument in the text, and calculate the The parameter also determines the concavity of s x [N; x c ; x n ( j) ; x n (j)] with respect to x n (j), but this concavity does not depend on . Intuitively, since there is a continuum of suppliers, a single supplier has an in…nitesimal e¤ect on output, and therefore she treats revenue as constant.
As a result, the parameter , which a¤ects the concavity of revenue in output (see (2)), does not a¤ect her investment decisions. At the same time, her payo¤ is more concave when is smaller, because greater complementary between the intermediate inputs implies that a given change in the relative employment of two inputs has a larger impact on their relative marginal products. The impact of on the concavity of s x ( ) will play an important role in the following results.
Equilibrium
To characterize a SSPE, we …rst substitute (20) into (14) to obtain the incentive compatibility constraint
Relative to the producer's …rst-best choice characterized above, we see two di¤erences. First, the term (1 ) implies that the supplier is not the full claimant of the return from her investment in noncontractible activities, as a result of which she underinvests in these activities. Second, as discussed above, multilateral bargaining distorts the perceived concavity of the private return relative to the social return. Now deriving the …rst-order condition of this maximization problem and solving for the …xed point by substituting x n (j) = x n yields a unique x n given by:
Note that x n (N; x c ) is increasing in x c . Namely, investments in contractible and noncontractible activities are complements, which is a result of the fact that the marginal productivity of an activity marginal contribution of the …rm to a coalition consisting of the …rm and n suppliers, each one investing xc in contractible activities and xn in noncontractible activities. The …rm's marginal contribution equals the revenue of the coalition because, without the …rm, revenue equals zero. Therefore the …rm's marginal contribution is
Notice that this can be expressed as
is the equilibrium level of the revenue (when n = N ). That is, the …rm's marginal contribution equals a fraction (n=N ) = of the equilibrium revenue. Moreover, for n < N , the fraction (n=N ) = is monotonically increasing in and monotonically decreasing in . Finally,
is the fraction of revenue R that the …rm receives in the bargaining game.
rises with investment in other activities. 19 An important implication of (23) is that investment in noncontractible activities is increasing in . This result immediately follows from the fact that (1 ) = = ( + ) is increasing in . But the economics of this relationship is more involved, because it is the outcome of two opposing forces. On the one hand, the share of the suppliers in revenue, (1 ), is decreasing in , because greater substitution between the intermediate inputs reduces the suppliers'ex post bargaining power. On the other hand, a greater level of reduces the concavity of s x ( ) in x n , thus also increasing the marginal reward from investing further in noncontractible activities. In our speci…cation the latter e¤ect dominates, and x n is increasing in . Now, using (21), (22) and (23), the …rm's optimization problem (16) can be expressed as 
1
(1 ) (1 ) 1
(1 )
As in the complete contracts case, these two conditions determine the equilibrium recursively.
First, (25) givesÑ , and then givenÑ , (26) yieldsx c . Moreover, using (23), (25), and (26) also
gives the level of investment in noncontractible activities as
Comparing (12) to (26), we see that for a given N the implied level of investment in contractible activities under incomplete contracts,x c , is identical to the investment level in contractible activities under complete contracts, x . This highlights the fact that di¤erences in the investment in contractible activities between these economic environments only result from di¤erences in technology adoption. In fact, comparing (11) with (25), we see thatÑ and N di¤er only because of the two bracketed terms on the left-hand side of (25). These represent the distortions created by 1 9 The e¤ect of N on xn is ambiguous, however. In particular, investment in noncontractible activities declines with the level of technology when ( + 1) < 1 and increases with N when ( + 1) > 1 . The reason for this result is the following. An increase in N has two opposite e¤ects on a supplier's incentives to invest. On the one hand, a larger number of inputs increases the marginal product of investment due to the "love for variety" embodied in the technology. On the other hand, the bargaining share of a supplier, (1 ) =N , declines with N . For large values of the former e¤ect dominates; for small values of the latter dominates.
2 0 The Appendix provides a more detailed derivation and also establishes that the second-order conditions are satis…ed under Assumption 1. bargaining between the …rm and its suppliers. Intuitively, technology adoption is distorted because incomplete contracts reduce investment in noncontractible activities below the level of investment in contractible activities, and this "underinvestment"reduces the pro…tability of technologies with high N . As ! 1, both of these bracketed terms on the left-hand side of (25) go to 1, and Ñ ;x c ! (N ; x ). That is, as the fraction of noncontractible activities approaches zero, the incomplete contracts equilibrium values Ñ ;x c converge to the complete contracts equilibrium values (N ; x ) . 21 The impact of incomplete contracts on productivity follows directly from their e¤ect on the choice of technology. In particular, de…ning productivity as output divided by total input use, we haveP = Ñ .
Implications of Incomplete Contracts
We now provide a number of comparative static results on the SSPE under incomplete contracts, and compare the incomplete-contracts equilibrium technology and investment levels to the equilibrium under complete contracts. The comparative static results are facilitated by the block-recursive structure of the equilibrium. In particular, given the second-order conditions, any change in A, or that increases the left-hand side of (25) also increaseÑ , and the e¤ect onx c andx n can then be obtained immediately from (26) 
The main results in this proposition are intuitive. Suppliers invest less in noncontractible activities than in contractible activities. This follows immediately from equations (26) and (27), which implyx
where the inequality is a consequence of (1 ) = = ( + ) < (recall (19)). Intuitively, the …rm is the full residual claimant of the return to investments in contractible activities, and it dictates these investments in the contract. In contrast, investments in noncontractible activities are decided by the suppliers, who (as highlighted by (21)) are not the full residual claimants of the returns generated by these investments, and thus underinvest in these activities.
In addition, the level of technology and investments in both contractible and noncontractible activities are increasing in the size of the market, in the fraction of contractible activities (quality of contracting institutions), and in the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs. 22 The impact of the size of the market is intuitive; a greater A makes production, and thus all investments and similarly more advanced technology choices more pro…table. That better contracting institutions, i.e., higher , encourage greater investments and the adoption of more advanced technologies is also intuitive. Better contracting institutions imply that a greater fraction of activities receive the higher investment levelx c rather thanx n <x c . This makes the choice of a more advanced technology more pro…table. A higher N , in turn, increases the pro…tability of further investments inx c andx n . Better contracting institutions also close the (proportional) gap betweenx c and
x n because with a higher fraction of contractible activities, the marginal return to investment in noncontractible activities is also higher.
Perhaps the less intuitive result is that a higher , corresponding to lower complementarity between intermediate inputs, also increases technology choices and investments. The reason is related
to the discussion in the previous subsection where it was shown that a higher reduces the share of each supplier, and thus their investments, but it also makes s x ( ) less concave, encouraging further investments by each supplier. Because the latter e¤ect dominates, a lower degree of complementarity increases supplier investments, and via this channel, makes the adoption of more advanced technologies more pro…table.
Next, it is useful to also derive the reduced-form pro…t function depicted in equation (1) in the Introduction. Combining (23), (24), and the condition for the …rm's optimal choice of x c , the …rm's payo¤ can be expressed as (see the Appendix):
(1 ) 1
1
This representation is quite tractable and can be used in a variety of applications, as we demonstrate in Section 5. The term Z ( ; ), which represents a measure of "derived e¢ ciency", captures the distortions arising from incomplete contracts. The extent of these distortions depends on the model's parameters as shown in Proposition 2. Moreover, we will see in Section 5 that how the elasticity of the Z ( ; ) function with respect to changes with respect to has important implications for which sectors are more "contract dependent". For this reason, here we state the following lemma (proof in the Appendix):
Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let ( ; ) ( @Z ( ; ) =@ ) =Z ( ; ) be the elasticity of Z ( ; ) with respect to and let let ( ; ) ( @Z ( ; ) =@ ) =Z ( ; ) be the elasticity of Z ( ; ) with respect to . Then, we have that It is also important to compare the equilibria with and without complete contracts. Recall that the incomplete contracts equilibrium converges to the complete contracts equilibrium when ! 1.
Together with Proposition 2 this implies (proof in the Appendix):
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let nÑ ;x c ;x n o be the unique SSPE with incomplete contracts and let fN ; x g be the unique equilibrium with complete contracts. Theñ
This proposition establishes that incomplete contracts lead to the choice of less advanced (lower N ) technologies. 23 Consequently, the level of productivity is also lower under incomplete contracts.
Furthermore, investments in both contractible and noncontractible activities are lower under incomplete contracts.
An Extension: Choice of Organizational Forms
An important insight of the incomplete contracts literature, and especially of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) , is to consider organizational forms (and the ownership of assets)
as a choice variable a¤ecting ex ante investments. Our framework is tractable enough to allow these considerations and can be used to discuss issues of vertical integration versus outsourcing, and how the employment relationship between the …rm and its suppliers should be organized. We now brie ‡y discuss how this can be done (with a more detailed treatment in Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman, 2005) .
We have so far assumed that the threat point of a supplier is not to deliver the noncontractible activities, which-in view of the Cobb-Douglas structure of the production function of the intermediate input in (4)-is equivalent to assuming that the supplier does not deliver X (j) at all. To deal with alternative organizational forms, assume instead that the threat point of a supplier is not to deliver a fraction 1 of her X (j), where 0 1. The magnitude of depends, among other things, on whether the supplier is an employee of the …rm or an outside contractor. Our analysis above corresponds to the case = 0, but the main results also hold for other values of . The key to this generalization is the following lemma, which is proved in the Appendix:
Lemma 3 Suppose that supplier j invests x n (j) in her noncontractible activities, all the other suppliers invest x n ( j) in their noncontractible activities, every supplier invests x c in her contractible activities, and the level of technology is N . Then the Shapley value of supplier j is given by (20), where 1
This lemma shows that the formula for the Shapley value is the same as before, except that now depends on . Consequently, the …rm's payo¤ in the bargaining game, which is the fraction of revenue, also depends on . It is useful to note that in (31) equals in (19) when = 0. In addition, in (31) is greater than in (19) when > 0. In other words, the …rm is more powerful in the bargaining game and obtains a larger share of the revenue when > 0. Finally, is increasing in and and decreasing in . In the limit, when goes to 1, the share also goes to 1, and the …rm has all the bargaining power.
We show in our working paper, Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2005) , that all the results in Propositions 2 and 3 hold for any 2 [0; 1), and also discuss how this framework can be used to analyze the choice between integration and outsourcing. Brie ‡y, suppose that for an integrated …rm, we have > 0, while with outsourcing = 0. 24 Then, when the choice of the upfront payment is not restricted, it can be shown that the …rm always prefers outsourcing to vertical integration. 25 2 4 An integrated …rm has > 0 because in this case the …rm owns all the intermediate inputs. In this event the most a supplier can do is not to cooperate in the use of her intermediate input, which will reduce the e¢ ciency with which the …rm can employ this input, but may not reduce this e¢ ciency to zero. See Grossman and Hart (1986) .
2 5 This result depends on the assumption that the …rm does not make any relationship-speci…c investment. Since suppliers are the only agents undertaking noncontractible relationship-speci…c investments, it is e¢ cient to give In contrast, when suppliers face credit constraints (in the sense that the upfront payment is restricted to be nonnegative), integration may be preferable to outsourcing. In particular, with credit constraints, when + < 1, there exists a unique 2 (0; 1) such that vertical integration is preferred by the …rm for < and outsourcing is preferred for > . Furthermore, is decreasing in , so that integration is more likely when there is greater complementarity between intermediate inputs. 26 
General Equilibrium
Our theory of technology adoption is simple enough to be used in many applications, and in particular in applications that require general equilibrium interactions. We illustrate a number of such applications in what follows. In these applications we assume that contracts are incomplete, so that 0 < < 1, and = 0 as in the baseline model. The …rm then solves (24) and the reduced-form pro…t function is given by (29), with de…ned as in (19) . Using this reduced-form pro…t function, we …rst construct a simple general equilibrium framework.
Basics
Assume that there exists a continuum of …nal goods q (z), with z 2 [0; Q], where Q represents the number (measure) of …nal goods. All consumers have identical preferences, given by the quasi-linear utility function
where e is the total e¤ort exerted by this individual and the elasticity of substitution between …nal goods, 1= (1 ), is greater than 1. In this formulation c x represents the cost of e¤ort in terms of real consumption.
As is well known, these preferences imply the demand function
where p (z) is the price of good z, S is the aggregate spending level, and
is the ideal price index, which we take to be the numeraire, i.e., p I = 1. Consequently, these preferences imply the demand function A [p (z)] 1=(1 ) for each …rm, which is identical to the them as much bargaining power as possible. But this will not necessarily be the case if the …rm were to also make relationship-speci…c investments. See, for example, Hart and Moore (1990) , Antràs (2003 Antràs ( , 2005 , and Antràs and Helpman (2004) . 2 6 See Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2005) .
demand function used in the previous sections, with A = S.
We assume that the degree of technological complementarity, , varies across …rms (or sectors) and we denote by H ( ) the cumulative distribution function of . The support of this distribution is a subset of (0; 1). This implies that if Q products are available for consumption, a fraction H ( ) of them are produced with elasticities of substitution smaller than 1= (1 ).
We explore one key general equilibrium feedback, which results from competition of producers for a scarce resource, labor. Assume that labor is in …xed supply L. Every individual has one unit of labor. Since N individuals serve as suppliers of intermediate inputs, the residual supply of labor for other activities is L N . We assume that the only other activity requiring labor is the process of adoption (implementation, use, or perhaps creation) of technologies. In particular, a …rm adopting a technology N requires C L (N ) units of labor. 27 Denoting the wage rate in terms of the numeraire by w, this implies that the cost of adopting technology N is
The wage rate w is taken as given by each …rm, but is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Using this notation, the …rst-order condition in the maximization of (29) for a …rm with substitution parameter is
Since each individual can be employed at the wage w in the process of technology adoption, their outside option as a supplier is w 0 = w. Equation (33) then implies that the technology choice depends on a A=w, which can be thought of as the extent of the market in real terms (or alternatively, the inverse real cost of technology adoption). Using this measure of real demand, the …rst-order condition (33) allows us to solve the technology choice N as a function of a, , and .
This solution is denoted by N (a; ; ). Finally, de…ning total labor use by a …rm with technology N as
condition (33) implies that N (a; ; ) is implicitly de…ned by
Although a is endogenous in general equilibrium, every …rm takes it as given. Proposition 2 implies that …rms with higher elasticities of substitution choose more advanced technologies, as indexed by N . Therefore this equation implies a positive cross-sectional correlation between the degree to which intermediate inputs are substitutable for each other and the level of technology adoption.
Given a …rm's desired level of technology, N (a; ; ), its demand for labor is C T [N (a; ; )].
Therefore the market clearing condition for labor is: 28
The left-hand side of this equation is the demand for labor, while the right-hand side gives the total supply, L. This market clearing condition uniquely determines the equilibrium value of a, i.e., our measure of the real demand level. To see this, note that (34) implies that N (a; ; ) is increasing in a, thus (35) cannot have multiple solutions. The relationship between a and the model's parameters, as embodied in this equation, illustrates the general equilibrium feedback in the model. Proposition 2 implies that N (a; ; ) is increasing in , so we may expect better contracting institutions to encourage all …rms to adopt more advanced technologies. However, the resource constraint (35) implies that not all the N (a; ; )'s can increase with Q constant. Consequently, the equilibrium value of a has to adjust to clear the labor market when rises. We now examine the implications of this insight in three alternative models. 29
Exogenous Number of Products
In this illustration we assume that the number of products, Q, is given, and that every product is produced by a di¤erent …rm. The labor market clearing condition is still given by (35). Since the level of technology is increasing in the extent of the market a and the cost function
is increasing in N , the demand for labor, i.e., the left-hand side of (35), is an increasing function of a, and (35) yields a unique solution for a. Using this value of a in (33) then determines the cross-sectional variation in technology adoption.
To illustrate general equilibrium interactions, and in particular, the implications of di¤erences in contracting institutions, compare two countries that are identical except for their 's. Di¤eren-tiating the …rst-order condition (34) yieldŝ
whereŷ, de…ned as dy=y, represents the proportional rate of change of variable y, ( ; ) is the elasticity of Z ( ; ) with respect to , and (N ) is the elasticity of the marginal cost curve C 0
Assumption 1 implies that (N ) > 0. Moreover, as proved in Lemma 2 ( ; ) > 0 and ( ; ) is decreasing in .
Obtaining a relationship between and a is now straightforward. Di¤erentiating (35) yields
The term in front of^ on the right-hand side of this equation is negative. It therefore follows that, when contracting institutions improve, wages increase relative to expenditure and a declines.
Equation (37) also shows that the proportional change in N in response to^ ,N (a; ; ), can be positive only for some 's and has to be negative for others, because the resource constraint implies that not all …rms can increase the level of their technologies. The question is therefore whether the level of technology increases in high-or low-…rms, which intuitively corresponds to whether high-or low-…rms are more "contract dependent". The answer follows from (36), together with the observation that @ ( ; ) =@ < 0 (from Lemma 2): the left-hand side of this equation is decreasing in , it is negative for high 's and positive for low 's. Therefore, the level of technology improves in the low-and worsens in the less-contract dependent, high-…rms. More precisely, it can be seen that there exists a critical value such thatN (a; ; ) > 0 for all < andN (a; ; ) < 0 for all > .
We summarize this result as (proof in the text):
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists 2 (0; 1) such that in the general equilibrium economy with Q constant, an increase in raises the level of technology N (a; ; ) in all …rms with < and reduces it in all …rms with > .
Comparative Advantage
We now extend the analysis to a world with two trading countries, indexed by`= 1; 2, in order to derive implications of the theory for comparative advantage driven by di¤erences in contracting institutions. 30 We continue to assume that there is a …xed number of products, and that every product is distinct not only from other products produced in its own country, but also from products produced in the foreign country. All products can be freely traded between the two countries.
Suppose that the two countries are identical, except for their contracting institutions. In particular, L 1 = L 2 , Q 1 = Q 2 and H 1 ( ) = H 2 ( ) for all 2 (0; 1), but the fraction of activities t hat are contractible di¤ers across countries. Without loss of generality, we assume that 1 > 2 , so that country 1 has better contracting institutions.
The equilibrium condition for technology adoption (33) holds in both countries, with di¤erent wage rates, w`, for the two countries (A is the same for both countries and equal to world expenditure, since all goods are traded freely). De…ning a` A=w`and N`( ) N a`; ; ` , this implies
; for all 2 (0; 1) ;`= 1; 2:
In addition, the labor market clearing condition (35) holds in both countries. This immediately implies that the country with better contracting institutions, i.e., country 1, will have higher wages and therefore a lower a`. 31
The pattern of trade can now be determined by comparing the revenues of …rms with the same value of , i.e., the same degree of technological complementarity, in the two countries. We show in the Appendix (see the proof of Proposition 2) that the revenue of a producer with elasticity in country`is
Revenue is increasing in total world expenditure, A, in Z ( ; ) ; and in the level of technology. But it is also directly a¤ected by the parameters through the last term on the right-hand side of this equation.
then country 1 is a net exporter of goods with substitution parameter . Consequently, we simply need to determine the distribution of R 1 ( ) =R 2 ( ) across di¤erent 's. From (39) we have
First note that both Z ; 1 =Z ; 2 as well as the last term in (40) are decreasing in . 32
Second, Proposition 4 implies that there exists an such that N 1 ( ) < N 2 ( ) for all > and N 1 ( ) > N 2 ( ) for all < . As a result, country 1, which has the better contracting institutions, tends to export low-products and import high-products. Nevertheless, when the elasticity of marginal cost C 0 T (N ), (N ), is not constant, country 1 may also export some high-products. When (N ) is constant, however, the proportional change in N (a; ; ) in response to an increase in is always smaller when is greater, because the partial @ ( ; ) =@ is negative (see Lemma 2). This implies that, with (N ) constant, R 1 ( ) =R 2 ( ) is necessarily decreasing in in equation (40), and there exists 2 (0; 1) such that
and the opposite inequality holds for all > . Consequently, country 1, with the better contracting institutions, is a net exporter in low-sectors and a net importer in high-3 1 Suppose not, then (38) implies N 1 ( ) > N 2 ( ) for all 's (since N`( ) is increasing in for given a), and so labor market clearing cannot be satis…ed in both countries.
3 2 Recall from Lemma 2 that Z ( ; ) is increasing in and , and @ ( ; ) =@ < 0. Therefore Z ; 1 =Z ; 2 is decreasing in whenever 1 > 2 . The fact that the last term is decreasing in can be established by straightforward di¤erentiation. such that in the two-country world equilibrium country 1 with 1 > 2 is a net exporter of products with < and a net importer of products with > .
The most important implication of this result is that di¤erences in contracting institutions create endogenous comparative advantage. A country with better contracting institutions gains a comparative advantage in sectors that are more "contract dependent," which, in our model, correspond to the sectors with greater technological complementarities between inputs.
Free Entry
We have so far assumed that the number of products Q is …xed in every country. Another source of general equilibrium interactions comes from endogenizing Q. To brie ‡y discuss this case, suppose that there is free entry into the production of …nal goods and the number of products is endogenously determined. In particular, suppose that an entrant faces a …xed cost of entry wf , where f is the amount of labor required for entry. This cost is borne in addition to the cost of technology adoption.
Moreover, in the spirit of Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003) , suppose that an entrant does not know a key parameter of the technology prior to entry. While in their models the entrant does not know its own productivity, we assume instead that it does not know , but knows that is drawn from the cumulative distribution function H ( ). Since the relationship between and productivity is determined in general equilibrium, the distribution of productivity is endogenous.
After entry, each …rm learns its and maximizes the pro…t function (29). This leads to the choice of technology as a function of the extent of the market a, the degree of contract incompleteness , and , i.e., N (a; ; ), which is characterized by (34). Let us de…ne (a; ; ) = aZ ( ; ) N (a; ; )
where Z ( ; ) is given by (30). This is an indirect pro…t function, in which pro…ts are measured in units of labor, and it is straightforward to verify that it is increasing in a, and .
Free entry implies that expected pro…ts must equal the entry cost wf , or
Since the expected pro…ts are increasing in the measure of the extent of the market a, this free entry condition uniquely determines the equilibrium value of a, without reference to the labor market clearing condition (35). Now, given the equilibrium value of a, the …rst-order condition (34) determines the cross-sectional variation in technology adoption. Firms with larger 's choose more advanced technologies and they are more productive. Consequently, the distribution of induces a distribution of productivity and …rm size in the economy. 33 Finally, we can use the labor market clearing condition to determine the number of entrants.
Since in addition to working in the adoption of technologies and serving as suppliers of intermediate inputs individuals now also work in the founding of the …rms, the market clearing condition (35) has to be replaced with
Using the values of N (a; ; ) from (34) and a from the free entry condition (41), we can use this modi…ed labor market clearing condition to solve for the number of entrants Q, and complete the characterization of the equilibrium. 34
Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a tractable framework for the analysis of the impact of the degree of contractual incompleteness and the degree of technological complementarities on the equilibrium adoption of technologies. In our model, a …rm chooses its technology corresponding to the range of intermediate inputs used in production, and o¤ers contracts to suppliers, specifying the required investments in contractible activities. Investments in the remaining, noncontractible activities are then chosen by the suppliers in anticipation of the ex post bargaining payo¤s.
We used the Shapley value to characterize the division of surplus between the …rm and its suppliers and derived an explicit solution to these payo¤s. Using this setup, we established that greater contractual incompleteness leads to the adoption of lower levels of technology. The impact of contractual incompleteness on technology adoption is greater in sectors with more complementary intermediate inputs.
We also embodied this partial equilibrium model in a series of general equilibrium setups and derived implications of this framework for industrial structure and the structure of comparative advantage. The model implies, for example, that societies with better contracting institutions have comparative advantage in sectors with greater technological complementarities (which are also the more "contract-dependent" sectors).
The analysis of general equilibrium is made tractable thanks to a reduced-form pro…t function that we derived from the partial equilibrium model. This pro…t function features a derived parameter that summarizes the impact on the …rm's pro…ts of the degree of contract incompleteness and the degree of technological complementarity. This structure makes it relatively simple to use our framework in general equilibrium applications.
A number of areas are left for future research. These include, but are not limited to, the following. The model assumes that all activities are symmetric; an important extension is to see whether similar results hold with a more general production function, where the …rm may wish to treat some suppliers of intermediate inputs di¤erently than others, depending, for example, on how essential they are for production. Another area for future study is an investigation of the simultaneous determination of the range of intermediate inputs used by the …rm and the division of labor among the suppliers. Finally, it is important to investigate whether the relationship between contracting institutions, technological complementarities, and the choice of technology, is fundamentally di¤erent when we use alternative approaches to the theory of the …rm, such as the managerial incentives approach of Holmström and Milgrom (1991) .
Second-Order Conditions in the Complete Contracting Case
Using the …rst-order conditions (11) and (12), the matrix of the second-order conditions can be expressed as:
The second-order conditions are satis…ed if this matrix is negative de…nite, which requires its diagonal elements to be negative and its determinant to be positive. The …rst diagonal element is negative; the second diagonal element is negative if and only if
and the determinant is positive if and only if
Note that if (1 + ) < 1 both of these conditions are satis…ed, and if (1 + ) 1, the second inequality implies the …rst inequality. Therefore Assumption 1 is necessary and su¢ cient for the second-order conditions to be satis…ed.
Proof of Proposition 1
The …rst part of the proposition is a direct implication of Assumption 1. The comparative statics of N follow from the implicit function theorem by noting that, except for , N increases in response to an increase in a parameter if and only if this parameter raises the left-hand side of (11). Using the results concerning the response of N to changes in parameters together with (12) then implies the responses of x to parameter changes.
Proof of Lemma 1 and Related Results
We develop here a more formal proof than the one in the main text that builds on the work of Aumann and Shapley (1974) . Let there be M suppliers each one controlling a range " = N=M of the continuum of intermediate inputs. Due to symmetry, all suppliers provide an amount x c of contractible activities. As for the noncontractible activities, consider a situation in which a supplier j supplies an amount x n (j) per noncontractible activity, while the M 1 remaining suppliers supply the same amount x n ( j) (note that we are again appealing to symmetry). To compute the Shapley value for this particular supplier j, we need to determine the marginal contribution of this supplier to a given coalition of agents. A coalition of n suppliers and the …rm yields a sales revenue of
when the supplier j is in the coalition, and a sales revenue
when supplier j is not in the coalition. Notice that even when n < N , the term N ( +1 1= ) remains in front, because it represents a feature of the technology, though productivity su¤ers because the term in square brackets is lower. Following the notation in the main text, the Shapley value of player j is
The fraction of permutations in which g (j) = i is 1= (M + 1) for every i.
= 0, because in this event the …rm is necessarily ordered after j. If g (j) = 1 then the …rm is ordered before j with probability 1=M and after j with probability 1 1=M . In the former case v z 
Substituting for (A1) and (A2),
x n ( j)
For " small enough, the …rst-order Taylor expansion gives
Now taking the limit as M ! 1, and therefore " = N=M ! 0, the sum on the right-hand side of this equation becomes a Riemann integral:
Solving the integral delivers
x c x n ( j) In addition, imposing symmetry, i.e., x n (j) = x n ( j), the …rm's payo¤ is
as stated in equation (22) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we verify that the second-order conditions are again satis…ed under Assumption 1. To see this, note that the problem in (14) is strictly concave and delivers a unique x n = x n (N; x c ), as given in (23). Plugging this expression into (24) we obtain The second-order conditions can be checked, analogously to the case with complete contracts, by computing the Hessian and checking that it is negative de…nite.
Here, we present an alternative proof which also serves to illustrate how the reduced-form pro…t function (29) in the main text is derived. In particular, notice that for a given level of N , the problem of choosing x c is convex (since < 1 + ) and delivers a unique solution: 
A , which will be used in Section 5 (see equation (39)). Next, the comparative static results follow from the implicit function theorem as in the proof of Proposition 1. First, @Ñ =@A > 0 follows immediately. To show that @Ñ =@ > 0 and @Ñ =@ > 0, let us take logarithms of both sides of (25), to obtain (1 )
and # (1 ) < is monotonically increasing in . Simple di¤erentiation delivers
which implies @F=@ > 0, and establishes that @Ñ =@ > 0. (1 # (1 )) 2 (1 (1 )) (1 ) < 0.
Thus, @F (#; ) =@ reaches its minimum over the set 2 [0; 1] at = 1, in which case it equals
This inequality follows from the fact that # + ln ( =#) is decreasing in # for # < , and is equal to 0 at # = . We thus have shown that @F (#; ) =@ > 0 for all , so that @Ñ =@ > 0.
Finally, note that straightforward di¤erentiation of (28) delivers @ (x n =x c ) =@A = 0, @ (x n =x c ) =@ > 0 and @ (x n =x c ) =@ > 0. And, in light of equation (26), the e¤ects of A, and onx c follow directly from those onÑ , where the inequalities become strict whenever C 00 ( ) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Comparison of (30) and ' is a parameter that only depends on and c x . We have that F (#; ) is increasing in both its arguments, and that # is increasing in , which establish part 1 of the lemma. To prove part 2, …rst note that @ 2 F (#; )
(1 # (1 )) 2 # (1 ) < 0, because # < . Moreover, 
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof follows from Proposition 2, since nÑ ;x c o converge to fN ; x g as ! 1, andÑ ;x c ; andx n are all increasing in (nondecreasing in , in the case of the investment levels).
Proof of Lemma 3
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. A coalition of n suppliers and the …rm yields a sales revenue of F IN (n; N ; ") = A 1 N ( +1 1= ) x c h (n 1) "x n ( j)
(1 ) + "x n (j)
(1 ) + (N n") x n ( j)
(1 ) i = , (A7) when the supplier j is in the coalition, and a sales revenue F OU T (n; N ; ") = A 1 N ( +1 1= ) x c h n"x n ( j)
(1 ) + " x n (j)
(1 ) + (N (n + 1) ") x n ( j)
(1 ) i = (A8) when supplier j is not in the coalition.
As in the case with = 0, the Shapley value of supplier j can be written as Plugging the new formulas for F IN (n; N ; ") and F OU T (n; N ; ") in (A7) and (A8) then delivers
i +N x n ( j)
For " small enough, the …rst-order Taylor expansion gives i (1 ) x c x n ( j)
Finally, integrating by parts delivers
x c x n ( j) 
